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One of the most basic characteristics of a federalist system of
government' is that the states composing the confederation are
themselves independent sovereigns. 2 In the United States, a federal form of government is guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which reserves to the states all
powers not expressly delegated to the federal government.'
The Eleventh Amendment,4 which immunizes states from suit
I See BLAcX's LAW DiCrIONARY 611 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "federal government"
as a "system of government administered in a nation formed by the union or confederation of several independent states").
2 See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the federal government is sovereign with respect to the powers surrendered to it and the individual states are sovereign as to all reserved powers); see
generallyAkhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,96 YALE LJ. 1425 (1987). Professor Amar discussed the events leading to the formation of the federal government
and explained:
[w] hat America needed, then, was some third model that balanced centripetal and centrifugal political forces-a harmonious Newtonian solar
system in which individual states were preserved as distinct spheres,
each with its own mass and pull, maintained in their proper orbit by the
gravitational force of a common central body. It was exactly such a system-"in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a
composition of both" -that the Federalists conceived in Philadelphia.
Id. at 1449 (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) (footnotes omitted); see infra note 3 (discussing the Tenth
Amendment).
3 See Kathryn Abrams, Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE
LJ. 723, 737 (1984); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992) (explaining that the Constitution divides powers between the federal and state governments);
see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (declaring that Congress
cannot exercise power in a manner that interferes with the integrity of the states or
their ability to effectively function within the federal system); but see Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (acknowledging that there
are limits on state sovereignty).
The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t] he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONSr. amend. X.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t] he Judicial
Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
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in federal court, addresses concerns relating to the states' integrity
and respect as components of a federal system of government.5 Because the Eleventh Amendment's provision of sovereign immunity6
ensures that states will not be forced to defend themselves in federal court, in most cases the Constitution protects unconsenting
states from the imposition of judgments by federal courts.7
United States ... to Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State
.... " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Article III prescribes federal
court jurisdiction based on two criteria. William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1983). First,
Article III permits federal jurisdiction when the parties to a case meet certain requirements. Id. Second, Article III provides for federal jurisdiction over certain subject
matters. Id. The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as a limit on the federal
courts' power to exercise traditional party-based and subject-matter-based jurisdiction
over suits. Id. at 1035.
The date traditionally given for the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment is
1798, when the President officially proclaimed the Amendment's ratification. John V.
Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L.
Rrv. 255, 256 n.8 (1994) (citations omitted). The states, however, were quick to accept the Eleventh Amendment, and the requisite number of states needed to ratify
the Amendment was obtained by February of 1795. Id. at 256. The conventional
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment has been that the Amendment creates a
.presumptive jurisdictional bar to private claims in federal courts against states, in the
absence of either the state's consent or an explicit congressional abrogation of the
state's immunity." Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 61, 61-62 (1989) (footnotes omitted); see also Fletcher, supra
at 1035 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as prohibiting federal jurisdiction over private suits brought against states and suggesting that
the Eleventh Amendment was intended as a limitation on Article III by limiting federal jurisdiction over state suits to those disputes initiated by the states).
5 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 400 (1994) (quotation
omitted).
6 See BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "sovereign immunity" as " [a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government
without its consent").
The words "sovereign immunity" do not appear anywhere in the Eleventh
Amendment. Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and the Rule of Law: Aspiring to a
Highest-Ranked View of the Eleventh Amendment, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 1, 8 (1992).
7 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984) (quotations omitted); see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 486 (1987) (discussing "the sensitive problems 'inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other'") (quoting Employees of the
Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare of Missouri v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of
Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 294 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)). It is important to
note, however, that the Eleventh Amendment has not been interpreted as shielding
states from suits brought by the federal government or suits brought by different
states. Massey, supra note 4, at 68 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128,
140-41 (1965) (citations omitted); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372, 373
(1923); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 672 (1838)) (other citations omitted). For a discussion of exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's provision of immunity see infra note 8.
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The Constitution in its initial form did not expressly provide
for state sovereign immunity from suit in federal courts." Consequenly, states were originally amenable to suit in federal fora. 9
8 SeeJohn J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1895 (1983) (explaining that based on Article
III's explicit conferral of federal jurisdiction over all cases dealing with constitutional
or federal questions, the Constitution did not provide for state sovereign immunity).
In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court explained that:
'The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and
to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been disclaimed by
many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government,
and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the
existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally
adopted.'
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974) (quoting 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1987 rev. ed. 1937)). The Edelman
Court noted the objections to state suability by James Madison, Chief Justice John
Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton. Id. at 661-62 n.9 (quotation omitted); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (declaring that "[i]t is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without...
[the state's] consent").
The initial purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to assure states that they
would not be forced by federal tribunals to pay their Revolutionary War debts, thereby
causing them great financial difficulty. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400 (quotation omitted)
(citing Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.1 (1959)
(quotation omitted); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933)); see also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405, 406 (1821) (explaining that the Eleventh
Amendment was passed to alleviate the states' apprehension that their debts could be
prosecuted in federal courts).
It is well recognized that exceptions exist exposing states to suits in federal court
despite the Eleventh Amendment. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
238 (1985). First, the Atascadero Court explained that a state may consent to suit in
federal court, thereby waiving its immunity. Id. (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,
447 (1883)). Second, the Atascadero Court noted that Congress, pursuant to section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment and its "power 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' may abrogate the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment absent state consent. Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
9 See, e.g., Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793) (allowing a South
Carolina citizen to maintain a cause of action in assumpsit against the State of Georgia in federal court). In Chisolm, the petitioner brought his suit in federal court pursuant to Article III's grant of federal jurisdiction over suits between "a State and
Citizens of another State." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). By a four-to-one
vote, the Chisolm Court held that unless Georgia could present timely defenses to
Chisolm's claim, a defaultjudgment would be entered against the State. Orth, supra
note 4, at 256 (citation omitted). The "immediate result of the majority decision in
Chisolm was a proposed constitutional amendment, which would become the first to
be adopted after the ten amendments comprising the Bill of Rights." Id. (footnote
omitted). Dissenting in Chisolm,Justice James Iredell delivered an opinion that would
later be a part of American constitutional history. Id. In subsequent decisions, the
Supreme Court looked to Justice Iredell's dissent as the guide for how the Amend-
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The response to state amenability to suit was overwhelmingly negative.1 ° As a result, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified to prevent
federal tribunals from imposing judgments on states.11
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields states from suit in
federal courts absent a state waiver of immunity or Congress's explicit abrogation of immunity. 12 Nonetheless, state officers acting
in their individual capacities, political subdivisions, and municipalities are clearly subject to suits in federal courts. 13 Thus, at issue in
ment should be interpreted. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890)
(proclaiming a preference for Justice Iredell's Chisolm dissent); see also Orth, supra
note 4, at 260 (discussing the perception thatJustice Iredell was a "state rightist").
Professor Orth believes that Justice Iredell's dissent has been misinterpreted. See
Orth, supra note 4, at 262-66. First, Professor Orth noted thatJustice Iredell's dissent
was based solely on the Judiciary Act of 1789 and not on the Constitution. Id. at 263.
Continuing, Professor Orth explained that "[t] o rediscover the statutory basis of UJustice] Iredell's dissent is to rediscover his consistency as a Federalist: one may dispense
with the 'states rights' qualifier." Id. at 266. Professor Orth posited that Justice Iredell wanted to avoid the state's rights issue by refusing jurisdiction over the case,
thereby foreclosing the debate that ultimately ensued. Id. at 267-68.
10 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11 (discussing the fact that the Chisolm decision resulted in
"a shock of surprise throughout the country"). Discussing the Chisolm case, the
Edelman Court noted that the decision to render a state amenable to suit by a citizen
of a different state "literally shocked the nation." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662. The Court
further explained that "[s]entiment for passage of a constitutional amendment to
override the decision rapidly gained momentum." Id.; see also supranote 4 (discussing
the passage of the Eleventh Amendment and its nearly immediate acceptance by the
states).
11 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11 (noting the passage of the Eleventh Amendment);
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63 (stating that unconsenting states are immune from suit in
federal court) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment and the reasons for its swift adoption, see supra notes 4 and 8.
12 See Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238.
13 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161 (1908) (allowing a claim for prospective
injunctive relief, brought against a state official acting outside the realm of his authority, to be litigated in federal court); Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 280-81 (1977) (holding that a school board is not conferred
with Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530,
531 (1890) (holding that a county is a corporate entity and that its relationship to the
state is too remote to be worthy of Eleventh Amendment protection) (citations
omitted).
Several commentators have questioned the rationale behind the Court's authorization of state officials, but not states, to be amenable to suit. See Kenny, supranote 6,
at 17-19; see also Gibbons, supra note 8, at 1891 (discussing Ex parteYoung). Professor
Kenny challenged the "Humpty-Dumpty" logic inherent in the Young Court's holding
that there was state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that Young was not
acting as a "state" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Kenny, supra note 6, at 17.
Furthermore, Judge Gibbons explained that "courts have come up with various elaborate fictions to evade the [sovereign immunity] doctrine's more restrictive implications." Gibbons, supra note 8, at 1891. According to Judge Gibbons, "[t]he Ex parte
Young rule that one can sue a state official acting under the color of state law is the
most prominent example" of such a fiction. Id. (citing Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123,
161 (1908)) (other footnote omitted).
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many cases is whether the party being sued is "the state" for Eleventh Amendment purposes.14 This question is particularly intriguing when a plaintiff seeks to sue an entity created pursuant to a
compact between two or more states and approved by Congress. 5
The inquiry in Mount Healthy involved an examination as to whether a Board of
Education is an "arm-of-the-state" protected by the Eleventh Amendment, or alternatively, whether the Board is a municipal corporation or political subdivision of the
state and not covered by the Eleventh Amendment. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
The Mount Healthy Court reasoned that "[t ] he bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit
in federal courts extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances...
but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations." Id. (citing
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 717, 719, 721 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.
459, 462 (1945); Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530). The Court looked to Ohio state law
to answer this question. See id. Explaining that Ohio state law does not consider
political subdivisions to be arms of the state and that Ohio law recognizes that school
districts are in fact political subdivisions, the Court held that the school board was not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal suit. Id. at 280, 281. The
Court explained that this was primarily due to the fact that "[o] n balance, the record
...indicates that a local school board such as petitioner is more like a county or city
than it is like an arm of the State." Id. at 280. Because the school board had the
power to issue its own bonds and levy its own taxes, the Court found that the board
resembled a political subdivision despite its receipt of guidance and significant funds
from the state. Id. (citations omitted).
14 See Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv.
1243, 1245 (1992) (explaining that although the Eleventh Amendment purports to
protect only the states themselves, the Supreme Court has extended sovereign immunity to protect state-created entities deemed "arms of the state"); see, e.g., Mount
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280 (discussing that the case turned on whether the board of
education was an "arm of the State"). The issue of whether it is a state or another
entity not part of the "state" within the contemplation of the Eleventh Amendment
that is being sued, invokes the question of whether the entity is an "arm-of-the-state."
See Rogers, supra, at 1243 (discussing the "arm-of-the-state" doctrine). The "arm-ofthe-state doctrine," Rogers explained, "bestows sovereign immunity on entities created by state governments that operate as alter egos or instrumentalities of the states."
Id. Rogers criticized the Supreme Court's system of determining whether an entity is
an arm-of-the-state, remarking that the Court "has resorted to a highly technical, ad
hoc approach employing unintelligible factors in a balancing methodology that seeks
to pigeonhole entities as either arms of the state or independent political subdivisions." Id. Rogers proposed a two-step analysis to determine whether the Eleventh
Amendment shields an entity. Id. at 1309. First, Rogers stated, courts should look to
the state's intent in creating the entity. Id. Second, Rogers continued, if the intent of
the state cannot be ascertained, courts should examine whether the state bestowed
the entity with the power to generate its own revenue. Id.
15 See, e.g., Hess v. Port. Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994). The
Compact Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "(n]o State shall,
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. In consenting to interstate compacts, "Congress certifies that the States are acting within their boundaries in our
federal scheme and that the national interest is not offended." Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 408
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of interstate compacts, see generally Fe-
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In a recent decision, Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,' 6
the United States Supreme Court considered whether a bistate entity, created pursuant to the Compact Clause and independent of
the states' treasuries, was immune from suit in federal court.' 7 Distinguishing bistate entities from individual states, the Court held
that Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH), a bistate
entity,' 8 was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 9 Because bistate entities do not reflect the interests of any single state
and because Congress is involved in the creation of these entities,
the Supreme Court declared that it would not be an affront to the
entity to make it amenable to suit in the federal court system. °
Two employees of the PATH railway were injured in unrelated
incidents.2 1 In separate actions, each employee initiated a suit in
lix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ. 685 (1924-25).
16 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (5-4 decision).
17 See id. at 397, 406.
18 Id. at 397 ("PATH [is] a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey."). The bistate entity was created pursuant to the Compact
Clause and approved by Congress. Id. at 398 (citation omitted). For a discussion of
the Compact Clause, see supra note 15.
19 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400.
20 Id. at 400, 401 (citations omitted).
21 Id. at 397. Albert Hess, a New Jersey resident, was injured in the course of his
employment for Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH). Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1172, 1173, 1174 (D.NJ. 1992), afftd, 8 F.3d
811 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 394, 397 (1994). Hess maintained that while
working on a commuter train's engine, the train's window malfunctioned and hit his
hand. Id. at 1174 (citation omitted). Hess alleged that the accident was caused by
PATH's negligence and that he was not careless or irresponsible in any manner. Id.
(citation omitted). Alleging that he was unable to perform his usual duties, Hess filed
a complaint close to three years after the accident occurred. Id. Hess's claim was
based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) and the Boiler Inspection Act.
Id. (citing Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. § 23 (1970) (mandating that locomotives
and boilers must be in proper condition and properly inspected before use); FELA,
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970) (delineating the nature of liability railroad corporations
have with respect to injured railroad workers)) (other citation omitted).
Seeking to dismiss the complaint, PATH contended that the Eleventh Amendment sheltered the agency from suit in federal court. Id. First, PATH maintained that
it is "an arm of the States of New York and NewJersey" and thereby entitled to immunity. Id. at 1175; see supranote 14 (discussing the "arm-of-the-state" doctrine). Second,
PATH explained that although the Supreme Court has held that consent-to-suit statutes constitute waivers of a state's immunity, the statutes in this case only consent to
suits brought within one year. Hess, 809 F. Supp. at 1175 (citing Port Auth. TransHudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1990) (citation omitted)). Therefore,
PATH argued that Hess's claim was time-barred. Hess, 809 F. Supp. at 1175 (citation
omitted).
Relying on Feeney, Hess argued that PATH waived its immunity entirely. Id.
Moreover, Hess maintained that the consent-to-suit statutes were irrelevant as Hess
brought his claim pursuant to FELA. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Hess as-
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federal district court pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FEIA) .22 Although the plaintiffs failed to meet the one-year
time limit delineated by state statutes consenting to suits brought
against the Port Authority, 23 both complainants met the three-year
statute of limitations prescribed by FELA.2 4
Pursuant to Third Circuit precedent conferring the Port Authority with sovereign immunity, 25 the district courts dismissed
both plaintiffs' actions.2 6 Because the plaintiffs did not sue within
serted that state sovereign immunity had been abrogated by FELA. Id. (citation omitted). To support this assertion, Hess cited Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways
Commission. Id. (citing Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560,
564-65 (1991) (holding that in state courts, states are not immune from suits brought
under FELA)). Hess argued that the Hilton case held that FELA abrogated any sovereign immunity that state-owned railroads may have possessed. Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, Hess maintained that even assuming that the consent-to-suit provisions
were relevant, they could not supersede FELA's three-year statute of limitations. Id.
Charles F. Walsh, the second petitioner, brought his action pursuant to FELA as
well. Walsh v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 813 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (D.NJ. 1993),
affd, 8 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 394, 397 (1994). Walsh, an employee
of PATH, alleged that he was injured as a result of PATH's negligence when a train
door slammed into his wrist. Id. PATH moved for dismissal based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted). The applicable consent-to-suit statute contained a one-year statute of limitations. Id. Walsh filed suit almost three years after
the accident occurred and alleged that FELA's three-year statute of limitations was
applicable. Id.
22 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397 (referring to FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1970)).
23 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-157, 32:1-163 (West 1990) (consenting to suits
and proceedings brought against the Port Authority provided that the actions are
instituted within one year after the cause of action accrued); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 7101, 7107 (McKinney 1979) (same as the New Jersey statutes, supra)).
24 Id.; see FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970) (providing a three-year statute of
limitations).
25 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 398. The district court relied on a Third Circuit decision
holding that the Port Authority was entitled to sovereign immunity because it could
turn to the state for financial aid in times of need. Id. (citing Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and NJ., 819 F.2d 413, 416, 418 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987)). The Third Circuit conferred the Port Authority with
sovereign immunity despite its "solvency and size of its General Reserve Fund," and
the remote possibility that the Authority would have to depend on state aid to cover
its liabilities. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 416.
26 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 398 (citing Walsh, 813 F. Supp. at 1098; Hess, 809 F. Supp. at
1185).
In holding that PATH was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district court in Hess explained that past state and federal courts had recognized the Port
Authority as "a direct governmental agency of New York and New Jersey, vested with
absolute immunity to suit." Hess, 809 F. Supp. at 1178 (citing Leadbeater v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 45, 47 (3d Cir. 1989), vacated on othergrounds sub nom.,
Benitez v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 495 U.S. 926 (1990); PortAuth. Police Benev.
Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 414-18; Trippe v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 198 N.E.2d 585, 586 (1964);
Luciano v. Fanberg Realty Co., 475 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855-56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Port of
N.Y. Auth. v. Weehawken, 99 A.2d 377, 379 (App. Div. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 103
A.2d 603, 608 (1954)). Based on the Supreme Court's assumption without deciding
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the one-year period in which the Port Authority consented to suit,
the district courts held that their actions were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 27 On appeal, the Third Circuit consolidated
the two cases and summarily disposed of the matter by affirming
that the Port Authority is entitled to sovereign immunity, id. (citing Feeney, 495 U.S. at
304-05), the court noted that Hess failed to object to PATH being treated differently
from the Port Authority. Id,
Next, Judge Lechner examined whether the States had consented to suits against
PATH in federal court. Id. at 1181. Although there were consent-to-suit statutes in
effect, one of the conditions of consent, the court held, was that suit be brought
within one year of the accrual of the claim. Id. at 1180 (citations omitted). Consequently, the court ruled that the States had not waived PATH's immunity. Id. at 1182.
The district court continued by addressing Hess's argument that he could sue
PATH in federal court under FELA. Id. (citation omitted). Remarking that a state
entity can only lose its immunity if Congress abrogates its applicability or the state
explicitly consents to suit, the court announced that the Supreme Court had already
found that in enacting FELA, Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. (citing Feeney, 495 U.S. at 301, 302, 305 (citation omitted); Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476, 478 (1987) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, the district court rejected Hess's reliance on Hilton, finding that Hilton
dealt with suits in state court and not with Eleventh Amendment preclusion of suing
states in federal court. Id. at 1183 (citation omitted); see Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 562 (1991) (holding that in state courts, states
are not immune from suits brought under FELA) (citations omitted).
Similarly, the district court in Walsh also dismissed the plaintiff s case. Walsh, 813
F. Supp. at 1096. Because the Third Circuit had held that the Port Authority was a
state agency protected by the Eleventh Amendment, Judge Bassler determined that
PATH, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port Authority, was also entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 1096-97 (citing Leadbeater,873 F.2d at 47 (stating that PATH is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port Authority); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 819
F.2d at 415 (holding that the Port Authority is a state agency entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity)).
The district court proceeded by analyzing whether any exceptions allowed Walsh
to maintain his suit against PATH. Id. at 1097. Rejecting Walsh's argument that
PATH consented to suit, Judge Bassler found that PATH had only partially waived its
sovereign immunity. Id. (construing Feeney narrowly and finding that PATH had only
consented to suit for a one-year period). Next, the district court rejected Walsh's
contention that Congress had abrogated the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment in FELA claims by pointing out that the Supreme Court had expressly rejected
Walsh's argument in the past. Id. at 1097-98 (citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 475, 476, 478
(holding that both FELA and the Jones Act did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity). Judge Bassler proclaimed that Hilton, a case coming from state court, was
not applicable in Walsh's situation. Id. at 1098. The district court therefore held that
the Eleventh Amendment immunized PATH and that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter in federal court. Id.
27 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 398 (citing Walsh, 813 F. Supp. at 1098; Hess, 809 F. Supp. at
1185). In the Hess case, the district court noted the anomaly in applying FELA's three
year limitation to suits against the Port Authority in state court, while applying the
state's one year limit to consent to suit in actions brought in federal court. Id. (citing
Hess, 809 F. Supp. at 1185). The district court further noted that a state court could
entertain Hess's action because the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suing a
state in state court. Id. (citing Hess, 809 F. Supp. at 1183-84 (quotation omitted)).
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both dismissals.2 8
To resolve an intercircuit conflict respecting immunity from
suit in federal court, 29 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.3"
Holding that PATH, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a financially independent bistate entity, was not immune from suit under the
reversed the petitionEleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court
31
cases.
their
remanded
and
ers' dismissals
In the 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana,3 2 the Supreme Court
addressed the breadth of federal jurisdiction in light of the Eleventh Amendment.3 3 In Hans, the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana citizen could not sue his home state in federal court because
the Eleventh Amendment implicitly forbade such suits.3 4 The
28 Id. (citing Hess, 8 F.3d 811 (1993)).
29 Id. at 400. The Supreme Court noted that Second and Third Circuit precedent

conflict on this issue. Id. at 399; compare Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
873 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1989), affd on other grounds,495 U.S. 299 (1990) (concluding that for Eleventh Amendment purposes, PATH is not a state agency) with Port
Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 418 (holding that the Port Authority was a
state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
In Feeney, the Second Circuit held that PATH was not deserving of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity protection. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400 (citing Feeney, 873
F.2d at 631). Finding that the "insulation of state treasuries from the liabilities of the
Port Authority outweighs both the methods of appointment and gubernatorial veto so
far as the Eleventh Amendment immunity is concerned," the Second Circuit allowed
Feeney's suit to be heard in a federal forum. Id. In Feeney, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision because Feeney sued within one year of his injury. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306-09 (relying on N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-157, 32:1-162 (West
1990); N.Y. UNcONSOL. Laws §§ 7106, 7107 (McKinney 1979)). Thus, the Court
found that there was no Eleventh Amendment problem implicated. Id.
In Port Authority Police Benevolent Ass'n, however, the Third Circuit concluded that
the Port Authority was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Port Auth. Police
Benevolent Ass'n, 819 F.2d at 415. The Third Circuit predicated its holding on three
bases. Id. at 415-17. First, the Third Circuit noted that state courts had characterized
the Port Authority as an entity performing state functions. Id. at 415 (citations omitted). Second, the court explained that the Authority could turn to the states to
recoup funds necessary for operating expenses. Id. at 416 (citations omitted). Finally, the Third Circuit detailed the Authority's strong connection to the states as
manifested by state appointment of commissioners, the Authority's performance of
state functions by involvement in commerce and transportation, and the governors'
power to remove commissioners. Id. at 417 (citations omitted).
Justice Ginsburg noted that in Hess, consent to suit could not be maintained for
jurisdictional purposes because the state's consent only lasts for one year. Hess, 115 S.
Ct. at 400. Therefore, the Court was confronted with the issue of whether PATH
could be classified as an entity entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Id.
30 Hess, 114 S. Ct. 1292 (1994).
31 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 406.
32 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
33 Id. at 9.
34 See id. at 15. Hans filed suit in the Circuit Court of the United States in Decem-
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Hans Court rejected petitioner's argument, maintaining that allowing a citizen to subject his state to suit in federal court absent
the State's consent would violate the principles underlying the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.35
ber of 1884 to recover the value of interest coupons attached to state bonds issued
pursuant to acts of the Louisiana legislature. Id. at 1. Hans alleged that the state
impaired a contract by failing to honor the bonds, thereby violating Article I, § 10 of
the Federal Constitution. Id. at 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (providing in pertinent part that "[n]o state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts").
The state allegedly violated the Constitution by enacting a new state constitution
declaring that "the coupon of said consolidated bonds falling due on the first ofJanuary, 1880, be, and the same is hereby, remitted, and any interest taxes collected to
meet said coupons are hereby transferred to defray the expenses of the state government." Hans, 134 U.S. at 2. Hans maintained that by replacing the old constitution
and voiding the value of the bonds, the state repudiated the contracts between bond
buyers and the state, thereby violating the United States Constitution's Contract
Clause. Id. at 3.
After Hans instituted suit by serving the governor, the attorney general excepted,
stating that the court lacked jurisdiction ratione person. Id. The attorney general
defended by explaining that unless a state agrees to be amenable to suit, the court
lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's suit. Id. The attorney general asked that the case be
dismissed, and his request was granted. Id. at 4, 5 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 24 Fed.
Rep. 55, 68 (1855)).
35 Id. at 11. The Court commented that the result Hans sought was no less shocking than the Supreme Court's decision in Chisohm, which allowed a suit against a state
in federal court. Id. at 10-11 (referring to Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793)).
In its opinion, the Hans Court discussed the Chisolm decision and the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Clearly favoring the dissent in Chisolm, the Hans Court
espoused Justice Iredell's position that the Constitution was never intended to provide individuals the right to sue sovereign states in a federal forum. Id. at 12, 18-19; see
supra note 9 (discussing Chisolm and Justice Iredell's famous dissent).
To further support its position, the majority quoted from Alexander Hamilton's
Federalist 81, which stated that "'[ i t is inherent in the nature of [state] sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent ....
The contracts
between a nation and the individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force.'" Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(maintaining that debt collection in federal courts "could not be done without waging
war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State governments, a power
which would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable")). The Court proclaimed that despite the breadth of Article III, it was clear that
Alexander Hamilton and Justice Iredell were correct, and that United States citizens
by and large concurred. Id. at 13-14.
In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,the Court observed that Article III was never intended as a provision which would make States
"'unwilling defendants in federal court."' Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479-80 (1987) (quoting Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare of Missouri, 411 U.S.
279, 291-92 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result)). Quoting Justice Mar-
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3" the
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,
Supreme Court continued its commitment to protecting the states
from suit in federal court.3 7 There, the Supreme Court determined that regardless of whether a State was a named party, the
Eleventh Amendment shielded state officers from suit in federal
court when they were being sued in their capacities as officers of
the -State.38 The Court further found that Eleventh Amendment

shall's concurring opinion in Employees v. MissouriDepartment of Public Health and Welfare, the Welch Court proclaimed that:
The Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular
holding in Chisolm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding, see, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana .... Thus, despite the narrowness
of the language of the Amendment, its spirit has consistently guided this
Court in interpreting the reach of the federal judicial power generally,
and "it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that
the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace
authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State
without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh
Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of
the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an
exemplification."
Id. at 479-80 (quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 292 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in
the result) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (other citation
omitted)).
Many scholars have criticized the Court's decision in Hans, noting its departure
from the language in the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Steven Breker-Cooper, The
Eleventh Amendment: A Textual Solution, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1481, 1485 (1992) (urging
that the Eleventh Amendment be interpreted as written); Gibbons, supra note 8, at
1893-94. Judge Gibbons explained that:
[t]he theory that is now uncritically accepted as the true meaning of the
eleventh amendment dates not to 1798-the year of the amendment's
ratification-but to 1890, when a peculiar and temporary set of political
circumstances led the Supreme Court, in one of the boldest examples
of judicial activism in its history, to rewrite the amendment, giving it a
meaning that its framers never intended it to have.
Id. at 1893.
36 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1944).
37 Id.; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (discussing the contributions of the Ford case to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
38 Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 463, 464 (citation omitted). The Ford Court explained that "[w]here . . .an action is authorized by statute against a state officer in
his official capacity and constituting an action against the state, the Eleventh Amendment operates to bar suit except in so far as the statute waives state immunity from
suit." Id. at 462 (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 50, 51 (1944)
(citation omitted); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 438-39, 440 (1900) (citations omitted)). The Court remarked, however, that "[w] here relief is sought under general law
from wrongful acts of state officials, the sovereign's immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment does not extend to wrongful individual action, and the citizen is allowed
a remedy against the wrongdoer personally." Id. (citing Matthews v. Rodgers, 284
U.S. 521, 528 (1932); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280,
287 (1912) (citations omitted)).

442

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:431

immunity could not be waived by the state officers' appearance to
defend in an action brought in federal court. 9 Concluding that
In support of the Court's conclusions, Justice Reed first noted that the petitioner
relied on Indiana Code § 64-2614(a), which required the petitioner to apply to the
state treasury to obtain a refund of taxes illegally exacted. Id. at 463 (explaining the
statute, which maps out the procedure a taxpayer must take to secure a refund of
taxes alleged to be illegally extracted). Justice Reed explained that upon the denial of
a taxpayer's claim the taxpayer was to recover the sum illegally exacted against the
state treasury. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 463 (footnote omitted). The Court contrasted this prescription for relief with a provision for recovery as against an individual. Id., 323 U.S. at 463. Secondly, the Court stated that petitioner's joinder of the
state's governor, treasurer, and auditor as defendants evidenced that petitioners sued
the defendants "as the collective representatives of the state, not as individuals against
whom a personal judgment is sought." Id. at 463-64 (noting that the defendants constituted the Department of Treasury's board). The Court noted that Ford did not
assert claims against the defendants personally in their individual capacities. Id. at
464. The Court stressed that the petitioners sought to obtain a refund of their taxes
and not to impose liability on the people sued. Id. Continuing, the Court stated that
"when the action is in essence one for recovery of money from the state, the state is
the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity
from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." Id. (citations
omitted). Observing that previous holdings have established that "the nature of a suit
as one against the state is to be determined by the essential nature and effect of the
proceeding," the Court held that petitioner's case was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 464, 470 (citing Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296
(1937); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921) (citations omitted); In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443, 492 (1887)).
The Court found that the Eleventh Amendment "denies to the federal courts
authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against the state without its
consent." Id. (citations omitted). In this case, however, the Court found that Indiana
had not consented to suit in federal court. Id. at 465 (citations omitted). Referring to
the jurisdictional provision of the Indiana statute, the Court analogized the situation
at hand to the Read case, which found that a similar Oklahoma statute made the state
amenable to suit only in state courts. Id. (citing Read, 322 U.S. at 54, 55). Quoting
Read, the Court noted that when dealing "'with the sovereign exemption from judicial
interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the
state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own
creation must be found.'" Id. (quoting Read, 322 U.S. at 54).
Examining section 64-2614, the Court found that the statute lacked the requisite
express and unequivocal indication that the state consented to suit in federal court.
Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, the Court inferred from the statute's venue requirements that the state's intent was clearly to limit suability to state courts alone. Id.
at 466. To further buttress its position, the Court examined other Indiana statutes
that expressly limited plaintiffs who chose to sue the state to bringing suit in state
courts alone. Id.
39 Id. at 466-67, 469. In Ford, the Court explained that the respondents conceded
that if it was possible to waive immunity by making an appearance, they had done so.
Id. at 467. Because no Indiana law had dealt with this question, the Court reverted to
the use of general policies. Id. The Court referred to the Indiana Constitution, which
states that "'[p]rovision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the
State, as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution; but no
special act authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed.'" Id. at 467-68 (quoting
IND. CONST., art. IV, § 24 (amended 1984)). The Court proclaimed that Indiana
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the Eleventh Amendment's provision of sovereign immunity acts as
an absolute bar to jurisdiction in suits where private litigants seek
recovery that will be paid from the public funds of the state treasury, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's claim for a state
tax refund.40
Then, in 1959, the Supreme Court considered whether a sueand-be-sued clause found in a bistate compact serves as a waiver of
the bistate entity's Eleventh Amendment immunity.41 The petitioner in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission4" brought a
negligence suit in federal court.4 3 The Supreme Court held that
the sue-and-be-sued clause served as a waiver of immunity, basing
its decision both on the congressional intent and the jurisdictional
clearly did not intend for there to be a policy allowing the state to consent to suit in a
particular case absent a general consent to suit in all similar cases. Id. at 468. Because
the state could waive its immunity only by enacting a general law, the Court found
that it could not be presumed, absent clear language indicating otherwise, that state
officials could have the discretion to permit or withhold consent on a case-by-case
basis. Id. Furthermore, in examining the role of the state attorney general, the Court
could not find any indication that the attorney general could unilaterally consent to
suit absent the state's statutory consent to suit. Id. Moreover, the Court stated that
Indiana decisions narrowly construe the power of the attorney general. Id. at 468-69.
Therefore, the Court reasoned, it is clear that no authorized officer of the State had
waived Indiana's sovereign immunity. Id. at 469.
Despite the fact that the Eleventh Amendment was not raised as a defense to the
suit until the suit reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that the State could
properly raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense at thatjuncture. Id. at 467. The
Court announced that adherence to the policy behind the Eleventh Amendment was
of such great importance that the state could raise sovereign immunity as a defense
even at that stage of litigation. Id.
40 Id. at 464, 470. The Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded
the case to district court, instructing the court to dismiss the case for "want of consent
by the state to this suit." Id. at 470. The Court stressed that "It]he advantage of
having state courts pass initially upon questions which involve the state's liability for
tax refunds is illustrated by the instant case where petitioner sued in federal court for
a refund only to urge on certiorari that the federal court erred in its interpretation of
the state law applicable to the questions raised." Id.
41 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 277 (1959).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 278. Petitioner brought a negligence suit under the Jones Act. Id. (citing
Seamen's Welfare (Jones) Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (allowing seamen, injured in
the course of their employment, to bring personal injury actions in the district where
the defendant employer resides or maintains a principal place of business) (amended
1982)). Petitioner's husband worked for the respondent commission and died in the
course of his employment. Id. The respondent, a bistate entity, was created with the
permission of Congress. Id. at 277. Missouri and Tennessee entered into a compact
creating the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission to operate ferries and build a
bridge across the Mississippi River. Id. (citations omitted). The compact specified
that the commission was to have the power "'to contract, to sue and be sued in its own
name.'" Id. (citations omitted).
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provision in the compact creating the entity.'
The Court once again found the Eleventh Amendment to be
inapplicable in 1979, this time in a case involving a bistate entity.4'
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 46 the
petitioners sued the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), a
bistate entity,4 7 in federal district court stating that the TRPA, its
executive officer, and members of its governing body engaged in
conduct that diminished the value of their property, in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Consti44 Id. at 279, 280. The Court based its opinion on the inclusion of a clause in the
compact instructing that the compact would not serve to limit the jurisdiction of any
of the courts "'of the United States over or in regard to any navigable waters or any
commerce between the states.'" Id. at 281. The Court found that:
[t]his proviso read in light of the sue-and-be-sued clause in the compact,
reserves the jurisdiction of the federal courts to act in any matter arising
under the compact over which they would have jurisdiction by virtue of
the fact that the Mississippi is a navigable stream and that interstate
commerce is involved. There is no more apt illustration of the involvement of the commerce power and the power over maritime matters
than the Jones Act.
Id. (citing O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39-43 (1943)).
The Court further explained that allowing petitioner's suit would not be enlarging
the jurisdiction of the federal courts; rather, it would simply be allowing a suit that has
traditionally been within the purview of federal jurisdiction-those involving interstate commerce and maritime matters. Id.
The Court noted that at the time the compact was entered into and approved by
Congress, the federal climate was clearly opposed to corporations that performed governmental functions receiving immunity from suit. Id. at 280 (discussing Keifer &
Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 390-91, 396 (1939)). Keifer held
that a sue-and-be-sued provision in a federal charter granted to a public corporation
was expansive and allowed tort suits against the public corporation. Keifer, 306 U.S. at
396-97. In light of the federal climate which dictated that sue-and-be-sued clauses be
liberally interpreted, the Court found that it would be inconsistent with established
policy to find a lack of consent to suit. Petty, 359 U.S. at 280-81. Consequently, the
Court declined to interpret the sue-and-be-sued clause more narrowly than the Court
had in Keifer. See id.
45 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
402 (1979).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 394. Located partially in Nevada and partially in California, Lake Tahoe
and its surrounding area is a popular tourist cite. Id. at 393. To coordinate activities
in the Lake Tahoe Basin area, and to conserve the basin's national resources, Nevada
and California decided in 1968 that they would create a single agency. Id. at 394.
Consistent with the constitutional requirement, Congress consented to the compact
and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) was formed. Id.; see Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 277.190-277.230 (Michie 1995)
[hereinafter "Tahoe Compact"]. TRPA was authorized by Congress to formulate and
execute a regional plan for public services, land use, conservation, recreation, and
transportation. Lake Country Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 394; see Tahoe Compact, arts. V
and VI (delineating TRPA's authority to make plans and regulations in furtherance of
the Authority's goals).
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tution.4 8 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
dismissal of the case and held that the TRPA was not entitled to
immunity.4 9 The Court acknowledged that although some agencies exercising state power have been allowed to invoke Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, 50 past courts have refused to extend immunity to political subdivisions.5" Absent a clear indication
that the states intended to confer immunity on a bistate entity, the
48 Lake County Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 394. Petitioners, owners of land in the Lake
Tahoe basin, filed a complaint against the TRPA in district court seeking both equitable and legal relief. Id. They alleged that TRPA, a government entity, violated the
U.S. Constitution by adopting a general plan and land-use ordinance that diminished
the value of their property. Id. The petitioners maintained that this action constituted a taking without just compensation, in violation of their due process rights. Id.
The petitioners stated that there was subject matter jurisdiction in federal court
based upon one of two theories. Id. at 394-95. First, petitioners contended that their
claim presented a federal question because their suit was predicated on the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 395 & n.7 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (defining
the requirements for federal question jurisdiction)). Alternatively, the petitioners alleged that the TRPA acted "under color of state law," and that their claim was based
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thereby basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Id. at 395 & nn.
8, 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (providing a cause of action for individuals whose
civil rights are deprived by state actors); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) (conferring upon
district courts original jurisdiction to hear civil rights cases)).
Despite concluding that the petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action for
inverse condemnation, the district court dismissed the complaint because the TRPA
lacked the authority to execute a taking. Id. at 395-96. The court further held that
the defendants were not liable because they were exercising discretionary functions.
Id.
Affirming the dismissal of the complaint as against TRPA, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reinstated the petitioners' claims against the individual defendants.
Id. at 396 (citingJacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1360,
1366 (9th Cir. 1977)). Rejecting the petitioners' jurisdictional claims based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the court of appeals found that the existence of a
compact between the states, executed with Congressional approval, made TRPA an
entity acting pursuant to federal authority rather than under the color of state law. Id.
The court, however, concluded that there was jurisdiction based on § 1331. Id.
Despite the existence of federal jurisdiction, and despite the respondents' failure
to raise Eleventh Amendment concerns, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the suit against
TRPA based on the belief that the TRPA was immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. With respect to the individual defendants, the court remanded the
case for a hearing, holding that those who acted in a legislative capacity were entitled
to absolute immunity, and those whose functions were executive in nature were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. Petitioners appealed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
TRPA was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and that those working in a legislative capacity were entitled to complete immunity. Id. at 396-97.
49 Id. at 402, 406.
50 Id. at 400-01, 401 n.18 (citing Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford
Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1944) (other citations omitted)). For a discussion of Edelman, see supra note 8. For a discussion of Ford, see supra
notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
51 Lake Country Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 401 (citing Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717
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Lake Country Estates Court concluded that bistate entities comparable to municipalities or counties are not protected by Eleventh
Amendment immunity.5"

Later, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon," however, the
Court held that a federal claim against a state hospital was barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. 54 The respondent, Douglas James
(1973) (citations omitted); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890))
(other citation omitted).
52 Id. The Court refused to adopt a liberal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, finding that "[b]y its terms, the protection afforded by .. . [the Eleventh]
Amendment is only available to 'one of the United States.'" Id. at 400 (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend XI).
In discussing the states' intent with regard to the creation of the TRPA, the Court
noted that Nevada and California filed briefs disclaiming any intent of conferring
immunity upon the TRPA. Id. at 401. The states referred to sections of the Tahoe
Compact that reflected their intentions of treating TRPA as a political subdivision as
opposed to "an arm of the state." Id.; see supranote 14 (discussing the arm-of-the-state
doctrine). In article III(a) of the Tahoe Compact, TRPA is referred to as a "separate
legal entity." Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401 (citing Tahoe Compact, art. III(a)
(discussing the organization of TRPA)). The Court proclaimed that in article VI(a),
the entity is explicitly deemed to be a "political subdivision." Id. (citing Tahoe Compact art. VI(a) (discussing TRPA's powers)). The compact agreement further stipulated that six out of ten governing members be appointed by cities and counties while
only two are appointed by each state. Id., 401 n.20 (noting Tahoe Compact, art. III
(a)). Moreover, the Court acknowledged that funding for the entity is provided by
counties, not the states. Id. at 401-02, 402 n.21 (citation omitted). Finally, the Court
noted that judgments against the TRPA and obligations of the TRPA are not binding
on either state. Id. at 402 (citation omitted).
Next, the Court stated that the function of TRPA, which was to regulate land use,
was one traditionally associated with local governance. Id. It was this local purpose,
the Court noted, which motivated the creation of the TRPA in the first place. Id.
Furthermore, the Court continued, although the TRPA, like towns, cities, and counties, was created by states, the states could not veto laws made by TRPA. Id. The
Court highlighted California's necessity to resort to litigation in an attempt to dictate
the TRPA's action as the most compelling indicator that TRPA was not an "arm-of-thestate." Id., 402 n.22 (citing California v. TRPA, 516 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Based on the intentions of the compacting States, the actual terms of the compact, and the functions of the TRPA, the Court concluded that absent an absolute
constitutional rule mandating immunity, no immunity should be granted. Id. at 402.
The Court stated that "[b] ecause the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no such rule,
we hold that TRPA is subject to 'the judicial power of the United States' within the
meaning of that Amendment." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XI).
53 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
54 Id. at 236, 247. The Court's Atascadero decision was delivered shortly after the
Court rendered its decision in Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985), which was a "watershed federalism case, seemingly undercutting the concept
of state sovereignty." Rogers, supra note 14, at 1258-59; see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554
(holding that in enacting wage and hour requirements as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress did not exceed its powers to legislate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause). Atascadero, however, "fortified state sovereignty by imposing the demanding
clear-statement rule upon both Congressional abrogation and state waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity." Rogers, supra note 14, at 1259 (footnote omitted).
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Scanlon, alleged that the Atascadero State Hospital refused to offer
55
him employment, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Overruling the Ninth Circuit, the Atascadero Court held that Congress, in passing the Rehabilitation Act, did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of suits against the states.56 In
reaching its holding, the Court addressed the respondent's three
arguments.5 7 First, the Court found that California's constitution,
which waived state immunity in certain instances, did not waive the
Eleventh Amendment's provision of sovereign immunity in this instance.5" Second, despite the Rehabilitation Act's broad language,
the Court concluded that Congress had not explicitly abrogated
55 Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 236. Scanlon, who suffered from diabetes and
was completely blind in one eye, claimed that he was denied a position because of his
handicaps. Id. He alleged that the hospital's actions violated the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and other statutes. Id.; see Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)
(prohibiting programs receiving federal funds from discriminating on the basis of
handicap).
The petitioners sought dismissal of Scanlon's claim based on the Eleventh
Amendment's sovereign immunity provision. Id. The district court granted the hospital's motion. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that the complaint failed to address an essential element of his claim; namely that a primary
purpose of the institution's receipt of federal funds was to provide employment. Id.
(citing Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Scanlon petitioned for certiorari and his appeal was granted. Id. (citing Scanlon
v. Atascadero State Hosp., 465 U.S. 1095 (1984)). The Supreme Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case based on a decision holding that
the section 504 prohibition of employment discrimination is not confined to programs that obtain federal aid primarily for providing employment. Id. at 236-37 (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 637 (1984)).
On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that
"'the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respondent's] action because the State, if it
has participated in and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act,
has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U.S.C. § 794."' Id. at 237
(quoting Scanlon, 735 F.2d 359, 362 (1984)). The Ninth Circuit found that consent to
suit could be inferred from the state's participation in programs funded by the Rehabilitation Act. Id.; see also Scanlon, 735 F.2d at 361.
The Supreme Court noted a conflict between the Ninth Circuit, as presented by
this case, and decisions made in First and Eighth Circuits. Atascadero State Hosp., 473
U.S. at 237 (citing Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 1, 6 (lst
Cir. 1983) (affirming the dismissal of petitioner's claim brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act based on the Eleventh Amendment); Meiner v. Missouri, 673 F.2d
969, 982 (8th Cir.) (affirming the dismissal of petitioner's claims, including a claim
under the Rehabilitation Act, based on the Eleventh Amendment), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 909 & 916 (1982)). To resolve this intercircuit conflict, the Court granted certiorari. Id. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 469 U.S. 1032 (1984)).
56 Id. at 246.
57 Id. at 240 (rejecting the respondent's three reasons for arguing the Eleventh
Amendment's inapplicability).
58 Id. at 241. The California constitution provides that "[s]uits may be brought
against the state in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." CAL.
CONST. art. III, § 5. Relying on this provision, Scanlon maintained that the constitu-
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the Eleventh Amendment's applicability. 5 9 Finally, reasoning that
tion subjected California to suits in any and all courts unless the state affirmatively
asserted its immunity. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 241.
The Atascadero Court explained that:
[t]he test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from
federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one. Although a State's general
waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is
not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.... As we explained just last Term, 'a State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but
whereit may be sued.'... [Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).] Thus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal
court.

Id. (other citations omitted).
Based on this stringent standard, the Court concluded that California's constitutional provision did not waive immunity. Id. The Court found that the provision did
not specifically articulate the State's willingness to succumb to suits in federal court.
Id. In fact, Justice Powell noted that the California provision appeared to be a simple
authorization to the legislature to waive immunity. Id.
59 Id. at 246 (citation omitted). The majority rejected the respondent's contention
that the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act indicated abrogation of immunity.
Id. at 242. Such a finding, the Court reasoned, would be inconsistent with past decisions which dictate "that Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute." Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Court proclaimed that the Eleventh Amendment ensures that the
proper balance between state and federal governments is maintained. Id. (quotation
omitted). Justice Powell proclaimed that congressional abrogation of state immunity
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment disturbs the traditional balance in a federal
system. Id. at 242-43 (citation omitted). Noting that the Eleventh Amendment guarantees such a balance, the Court declared that "it is incumbent upon the federal
courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides the
guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statutory language ensures such certainty." Id. at
243; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions Duringthe 1988-89 Term, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 321, 332
(1990) (referring to the strict requirement of express abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment as the "clear statement rule").
Next, Justice Powell remarked that an additional inquiry must be made in determining Congressional abrogation of state immunity. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at
243. The courts, Justice Powell stated, must determine whether their jurisdiction has
been expanded. Id. Justice Powell announced that "[a]lthough it is of course the
duty of this Court 'to say what the law is,' . . . it is appropriate that we rely only on the
clearest indications in holding that Congress has enhanced our power." Id. (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)); see also American Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951) (explaining that "[t]
he jurisdiction of the federal courts
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation"). Therefore, the
majority upheld the high standard requiring "that Congress must express its intention
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself."
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243 (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell continued by questioning whether Congress intended to abrogate
sovereign immunity in passing the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 244. The Justice noted
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Congress had never made acceptance of federal funds conditional
on a state's waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court rejected the
respondent's contention that the State consented to suit by ac60
cepting federal aid.
Only two years later, in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways
and Public Transportation,6 1 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Atascadero.6 2 In Welch, the petitioner filed suit under the
Jones Act, which requires injured seamen to bring suit in district
court. 63 Based on the Eleventh Amendment's conferral of sovereign immunity, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's
claim.64 Drawing a parallel between this case and Atascadero, the
that the statute provides relief for any violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by
"'any recipient of Federal assistance.'" Id. at 245 (quotation omitted). In holding
that the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment state immunity,
the majority concluded that:
given their constitutional role, the States are not like any other class of
recipients of federal aid. A general authorization for suit in federal
court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject
the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.
Id. at 246 (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 (citing Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979))).
60 Id. at 247. The majority reversed the Ninth Circuit's determination that the
State consented to suit by accepting federal aid. Id. at 246 (citing Scanlon v. Atascadero
State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982)). First, the Court found that the Rehabilitation Act did not explicitly manifest Congress's intent to subject states to federal
jurisdiction absent their consent. Id. at 247. Second, the Court determined that the
Rehabilitation Act did not force states to waive their immunity as a condition for receiving federal aid. Id.
61 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
62 Id. at 471-72.
63 Id. at 471 & n.1; seeJones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982) (allowing seamen injured in the course of their employment to sue their employers in district court).
Petitioner, Jean Welch, was injured in the course of working on a state ferry dock in
Texas. Welch, 483 U.S. at 471. Petitioner's suit was instituted pursuant to § 33 of the
Jones Act, which requires that seamen, injured in the course of employment, bring
personal injury suits in " 'the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located."' Id. at 471 & n.1 (quoting 46 U.S.C.
§ 688(a) (1982)).
64 Id. at 471-72. Holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit in federal
court, the district court dismissed Welch's complaint. Id. at 471 (citing Welch v. State
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 533 F. Supp. 403, 407 (S.D. Tex. 1982)). A divided
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court. Id. (citing Welch v. State Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 739 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1984)). On rehearing en banc, however,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Id. (citing Welch v. State
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 780 F.2d 1268, 1290 (5th Cir. 1986)). The Welch
Court noted that the court of appeals discussed Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, which held that a state employee could bring a claim
against the State under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA). Id. (citing
Parden v. Terminal Ry. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964); FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 5160 (1963) (delineating the recourse for injured railroad employees)). The Court ex-
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Court refused to find that the broad language of the Jones Act
served to expose the states to suit in federal court.6 5 The Court
reasoned that state immunity must be upheld to preserve the integrity of the State in a federal system of government, which is based
66
on two distinct sovereigns.
Against this foundation of precedent, the United States
Supreme Court, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,6 determined that the Eleventh Amendment failed to immunize PATH, a
bistate entity, from suit in federal court. 68 Because of factors indicating that PATH is an entity separate from its creator States,6 9 and
because PATH was conceived as a financially-independent organization,70 the Court held that state sovereign immunity did not
71
shield it from suit in federal court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg began by providing
plained that Parden is relevant to the Welch case because the Jones Act applied FELA
to seamen. Id. (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982)). The Supreme Court
noted that despite the Parden decision, the Fifth Circuit concluded that although not
explicitly rejected, Parden had been limited significantly. Id. (quotation omitted); see
Welch, 780 F.2d at 1270-71 (explaining that Parden'sbreadth was limited by a Supreme
Court decision holding that in order to collect on a private federal remedy, state
employees must show that Congress intended to extend the remedy to them) (citations omitted).
Relying on the Supreme Court's Atascadero decision, the court of appeals found
that there was no explicit abrogation of immunity in the Jones Act itself, and that the
State had not waived its immunity with respect to Jones Act suits. Welch, 483 U.S. at
471-72 (citing AtascaderoState Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242); see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Atascadero decision). Therefore, the court of appeals
held that the State was immune from suit in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment. Welch, 483 U.S. at 472 (citing Welch, 780 F.2d at 1273-74 (citation
omitted)).
The Supreme Court granted petitioner's writ of certiorari to determine whether
the claim was jurisdictionally barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. (citing Welch,
479 U.S. 811 (1986)).
"[
65 Id. at 476. The Court noted that
b] ecause of the role of the States in our
federal system, '[a] general authorization for suit in the federal court is not the kind
of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.'"
Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp., 478 U.S. at 246 (holding that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not contain the explicit language necessary to negate Eleventh
Amendment immunity)) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973)).
66 Id. at 488 (quotation omitted). Writing for the majority, Justice Powell reminded that "[ b ] ecause of the sensitive problems 'inherent in making one sovereign
appear against its will in the courts of the other,'.., the doctrine of sovereign immunity plays a vital role in our federal system." Id. at 486-87 (quoting Employees, 411 U.S.
at 294 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result)).
67 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (5-4 decision).
68 Id. at 397.
69 Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
70 Id. at 403.
71 Id. at 406.
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an analysis of the nature and characteristics of the Port Authority. 2
The Justice explained that the Port Authority was created pursuant
to an interstate compact approved by Congress.7" Noting the Port
Authority's geographic domain,' the Court stated that the Port
Authority was intended to be financially independent with its funds
coming from private investors.75 Justice Ginsburg then discussed
the Port Authority's internal governance and the States' role in appointing the Port Authority's directors and in initiating Authority
action.76
Continuing, the Court instructed that the founding States are
not liable for the debts and liabilities incurred by the Port Authority. 77 The Court observed that the States agreed to contribute a

small amount to the Port Authority only if the money was necessary
to cover administrative expenses and salaries. 78 The Court noted,
72 Id. at 398-99 (citations omitted).
73 Id. at 398 (citation omitted). The Court noted that New York and New Jersey
entered into the compact to better achieve efficiency and coordination in transportation and commercial activities. Id. (quoting NJ. STAT ANN. §§ 32:1-1 (West 1990);
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6401 (McKinney 1979)).
74 Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-3 (West 1990) (delineating the boundaries of
the "Port of New York District"); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6403 (McKinney 1979)
(same as the New Jersey statute)).
75 Id. (citing United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 4 (1977)). Fees,
tolls, and investment income, the Court noted, account for the Port Authority's financial stability. Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
76 Id. (citations omitted). Twelve state-selected commissioners serve as the Port
Authority's directors and govern the Port Authority. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32:1-5, 32:1-35.61, 32:12-3 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6405, 6612 (McKinney 1979) (other citation omitted). The commissioners can be removed if the
State that appointed them can establish cause. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-5,
32:12-5 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6405 (McKinney 1979) (other citation
omitted). Furthermore, the compact requires four of the six commissioners to be
residents of the State that appointed them. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-5 (West
1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6405 (McKinney 1979)).
The governor of each State has the authority to veto actions taken by directors
appointed by that State. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-17, 32:1-35.61, 32:2-6 to
32:2-9 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6417, 6612, 7151-7154 (McKinney
1979)). The state legislatures can change the powers and responsibilities of the Port
Authority only by actingjointly. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-8 (West 1990); N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAws § 6408 (McKinney 1979)). Furthermore, the state legislatures are
jointly responsible for determining how the Port Authority should allocate excess revenues. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-142 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§ 7002 (McKinney 1979)).
77 Id. The Court articulated that pursuant to the compact and the statutes implementing the Port Authority, the Authority could not draw on revenue from state
taxes, impose charges on the treasuries of either State, or pledge either State's credit.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-8, 32:1-33 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws
§§ 6408, 6459 (McKinney 1979)).
78 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-16 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6416
(McKinney 1979)). Governors of both States must approve the Authority's adminis-
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however, that a judgment against the Port Authority could not be
obtained against either State individually.7 9
After providing a brief history of the Eleventh Amendment, °
the Court distinguished the nature of bistate entities from that of
states. 81 Contrasting bistate entities with states, the Court indicated
that bistate entities represent three different components as opposed to a single state, which represents only its citizens.8 2 The
the ingoals of bistate entities, the Court elaborated, fail to reflect
83
terests of any single state or the national government.
Next, the Court submitted that the functions performed by bistate entities extend beyond regional interests, affecting national
interests.8 4 The Court articulated that the Port Authority exemplifies the usefulness of bistate entities, noting that states could work
together to accomplish feats neither state could undertake alone. 5
Proceeding, the Court explained that making Compact Clause entities amenable to suit in federal courts would not be an affront to
the entity's dignity.8 6 Because federal courts represent the interests of one of the compact entity's components, the Court rea8 7
soned that federal courts are not detached from the controversy.
Furthermore, the Court indicated that an individual state's integtrative expenses and there is an annual ceiling of $100,000 for contributions from
each State. Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-16 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWs
§ 6416 (McKinney 1979)).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 400. The Court stated that the Amendment's purpose is to protect states
from being sued in federal courts absent their express consent. Id.; see supra note 4
(discussing the history of the Eleventh Amendment). The Court explained that plaintiffs who want to sue states not consenting to suit in federal court must bring their
claims in state courts. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400.
81 Id. at 400-01 (citations omitted).
82 See id. at 400. Noting that states are "separate sovereigns" and distinct elements
of a union, the Court explained that bistate entities created pursuant to an interstate
compact represent three constituencies: each founding state and the federal government. Id.
83 See id. at 400-01 (citation omitted); see also Frank P. Grad, Federal-StateCompact: A
New Experiment in Cooperative Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 825, 854-55 (1963). Grad
explained that entities formed pursuant to a compact deal with regional problems;
therefore, they should not be interpreted as manifesting state-like sovereignty. See
Grad, supra, at 854 (explaining that such compacts should not be regarded as "narrow
concept[s] of state sovereignty"). Rather, these entities should be viewed as "independently functioning parts of a regional polity and of a national union." Id. at 854-55.
84 Id. at 401 (citing West Virginia ev reL Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951)).
85 Id. (citation omitted). The Court commented that the States, "'independent
but futile in their respective spheres,'" could not make the best use of their ports on
the Hudson River absent unified action. Id. (quoting Frankfurter, supra note 15, at
697).
86 Id. at 401.
87 Id. Because of the requirement that Congress approve of the compact, the
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rity would not be diminished as a result of suit in federal court.,,
The Court emphasized that this is especially true when, as here, the
case arises under federal law. 9 Proffering that the characteristics
of a bistate entity do not evince a tight bond with the people of one
state, 90 Justice Ginsburg declared that bistate entities are not subject to the wishes of the citizens of any single state by virtue of the
various parties involved in an interstate compact.9 Thus, the
Court concluded that there is no reason to accord a compact entity
with the Eleventh Amendment immunity to which a state is
entitled. 9
This holding, the Court noted, is consistent with Lake Country
Estates, the only other case where the Court determined whether a
bistate entity was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 93 Recounting the Lake Country Estates decision, wherein the Court denied immunity,9 4 Justice Ginsburg commented that Hess is a more
Court contended that federal courts are not "instruments of a distant, disconnected
sovereign." Id.; see supra note 15 (discussing the Compact Clause).
88 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 401. The Court emphasized that federal courts should not be
viewed as remote tribunals with respect to the compacts, which are "cooperative
trigovernmental arrangements." Id.; see supra note 15 (discussing the Compact
Clause); see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 314, 315
(1990) (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (observing that
no single state dominates in a bistate compact; rather, it is shared federal and state
power that pervades the governance of the entity); MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE
COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALtsM 297-300 (1971) (discussing the role that states
play in an interstate compact and concluding that entry into a compact diminishes a
state's ability to act independently within the scope of activities encompassed in the
compact).
89 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 401 (citation omitted).
90 Id. The Court explained that compact entities' "political accountability is diffuse; they lack the tight tie to the people of one State that an instrument of a single
state has[.]" Id. The Court further reminded that "'[a]n interstate compact, by its
very nature, shifts a part of the state's authority to another state or states, or to the
agency the several states jointly create to run the compact."' Id. (quoting RIDGEWAY,
supra note 88, at 300); see supra note 15 (discussing the Compact Clause).
91 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 401, 402. In contrast, the Justice stated, single state entities,
created exclusively to serve its state's constituents, are subject to wishes of the citizenry
of one state. Id. at 402.
92 Id.
93 Id. For a discussion of Lake County Estates, Inc., see supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. The Hess Court noted two prior decisions where bistate entities had
waived their immunity. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 402 n.12 (citing Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308-09;
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281 (1959)).
94 Id. at 402. In Lake Country Estates, Inc., TRPA argued that because both of its
founding states were protected by sovereign immunity, "then surely [the Eleventh
Amendment] ... must shield [TRPA,] an entity 'so important that it could not be
created by [two] States without a special Act of Congress.'" Id. (quoting Lake Country
Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 400). The Lake Country Court rejected an expansive reading of
the Eleventh Amendment, stating that "[b]y its terms, the protection afforded by...
[the Eleventh] Amendment is only available to 'one of the United States.'" Lake Coun-
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difficult case because the indicators of immunity do not all point in
one direction.9 5
Because the Port Authority was conceived as an entity financially independent from the States, the Court determined that the
Authority was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.96 The Court reasoned that lack of reliance on the state
treasury was an indicator weighing heavily in favor of a finding that
the entity did not deserve immunity.9 7 The Hess Court rejected the
Third Circuit's justification for immunity, which was that the States
would contribute money to PATH in limited situations.98 Instead,
Justice Ginsburg adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning in Feeney,
try Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 400 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI). The Lake Country
Court further explained that despite possessing "slices of state power," political subdivisions are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 401.
95 Hess, 115 S.Ct. at 402. The Court noted that in Lake Country Estates, Inc., all
indicia of whether immunity should have been extended to TRPA indicated that the
entity was not entitled to protection. Id. Continuing, the Court explained that in
Lake Country Estates, Inc., it was conceded that TRPA was a political subdivision in the
compact itself, and the majority of TRPA's members were required to be municipal
appointees. Id. With respect to TRPA, the Hess Court explained that the compact
explicitly stated that it was not to be construed as binding either state. Id. Justice
Ginsburg articulated that TRPA's main purpose was to regulate land use-a function
traditionally handled by local governments. Id. Furthermore, the Hess Court noted
that no state could veto TRPA's rules and that it was TRPA's local governance function itself that gave rise to the suit in the first place. Id. (citation omitted).
Discussing the Port Authority, the Hess Court stated that although eight of the 12
commissioners are required to be resident voters of New York City or the port district,
indicating local governance, this factor is offset by the States' control over the Authority. Id. The Court further explained that the commissioners are all state appointees
whose decisions could be vetoed by their state's governor. Id. Furthermore, the
Court continued, the States, acting together, could expand the Port Authority's duties
and responsibilities by joint legislative action. Id. at 402-03. For a list of statutes concerning the creation and governance of the Port Authority, see supra notes 72-78.
Additionally, the Court stated that neither the compact nor the implementing
legislation referred to the Authority as a state agency. Hess, 115 S.Ct. at 403. In fact,
the Court noted that in state decisions, the Port Authority was deemed to be an
agency of the State as opposed to a political subdivision. Id. (citing Whalen v. Wagner, 152 N.E.2d 54, 58 (N.Y. 1958)).
Because transportation concerns are implicated on both local and state levels,
Justice Ginsburg related, Port Authority functions could not be clearly categorized
either as local or state actions. Id. Therefore, the consideration of the Port Authority's functions did not advance the Court's Eleventh Amendment inquiry. Id.
96 Id. at 403, 405, 406 (citing United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1,4
(1977)) (other citation omitted). The Court further noted that New York and New
Jersey are not liable for the Port Authority's debts, nor are they responsible for judgments against the Authority or PATH. Id. at 406.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 403 (citing Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d
413, 416 (3d Cir. 1987)); see supra note 77 (discussing the Port Authority's ability to
receive small sums of money from the state treasuries in limited scenarios).

1995]

NOTE

455

which emphasized the extremely limited financial commitment the
States made to the Port Authority. 99
Next, the majority explained that when traditional indicators
of immunity compel opposite conclusions, the Court will look to

the two purposes behind the application of the Eleventh Amendment as a guide. 10 The Court stated for a second time that subjecting a Compact Clause entity to suit in federal court would not

be disrespectful to any one state.'

Moreover, the Court com-

mented that the federal courts do not represent wholly alien inter-

ests, as Congress
is involved with the creation of a Compact Clause
02
entity.1
After establishing that there would be no affront to either
State's dignity, the Court proceeded to examine whether there was
sufficient evidence to believe that both the States and Congress intended for the Authority to enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity.' 03 Addressing PATH's argument that it was entitled to
immunity because of alleged state control, the Court rejected the

entity's logic on two grounds." 4 First, the Court enunciated that
every state-created entity is state-controlled to an extent because
states can repeal the actions that created the entity.'0 5 Second, the
Court reemphasized that no single state could control1 0 the
actions
6
of an entity created pursuant to the Compact Clause.
99 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 403 (citing Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873
F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989), affd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)). The Feeney
court explained that three characteristics of the States' financial commitment to the
Port Authority evidence the States' intentions of remaining insulated from the Authority's expenses and liabilities: 1) the Port Authority is barred from relying on state
backing as collateral for its liabilities; 2) even the $100,000 allowance to the Port Authority could only be issued after approval from the governor of each state; and 3) the
allowance is very limited in nature. Feeney, 873 F.2d at 631.
100 Id. at 404 (citation omitted).
101 Id.; see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (explaining that suability would
not be an affront to state dignity).
102 Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 404.
103 Id. (citation omitted).
104 Id. PATH stressed that the Eleventh Amendment should extend to the entity
because the States have control and wield authority over it by virtue of the governors'
veto power and the States' appointment of commissioners. Id.
105 Id. Quoting Feeney, the Court remarked that "'[political subdivisions exist solely
at the whim and behest of their state,' . . . yet cities and counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. (quoting Feeney, 495 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted)) (citing Mount
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).
106 Id. (citation omitted). One commentator has noted the uncertainty with respect to the application of a control test in assessing whether immunity should be
conferred on a bistate entity. Rogers, supra note 14, at 1284.
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Further rejecting PATH's proposed control test, the Court
noted that one purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to prevent state treasuries from being depleted by federal judgments. 1°7
To bolster the majority's reliance on the treasury factor, Justice
Ginsburg referred to circuit court decisions holding that the most
important factor in determining immunity is whether an entity is
supported by state treasuries.' 8 Thus, the Court proclaimed that
the Port Authority's history of financial independence supported
the majority's finding that the Authority is not shielded by the Eleventh Amendment.'0 9
Continuing, Justice Ginsburg refused to accept PATH's contention that the entity should be conferred with sovereign immunity because it dedicates its surplus earnings to funding state
causes."t 0 Although an entity may use excess earnings to perform
charitable functions that otherwise might be undertaken by the
state, the majority concluded that this function does not equate the
entity with a state and does not confer state status for sovereign
immunity purposes."'
Finally, noting the lack of intercircuit conflict concerning the
Id. (citing Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1129).
108 Id. (citing Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 1994);
Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 999 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994);
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 942-43
(1st Cir. 1993); Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 818 (3d Cir.
1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2281 (1992); Barket, Levy, & Fine, Inc. v. St.
Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1991); Feeney v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989), afrd, 495 U.S. 299
(1990); Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986)).
109 Id. at 405, 406. The Court contrasted Hess with Alaska Cargo Transport, Inc. v.
Alaska Railroad Corp., wherein a railroad corporation was accorded Eleventh Amendment immunity because it was a thinly-capitalized venture that was highly dependent
on the State for funds. Id. at 405 (citing Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska RR.
Corp., 5 F.3d 378, 381, 382 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Court also distinguished the case at
bar from Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, wherein sovereign
immunity shielded an interstate entity because Congress and the states foresaw that
the entity would be heavily dependent on funds from the governments of the participating states. Id. (citing Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d
218, 225-27, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
107

110 Id. at 405-06.
111 Id. at 406. Justice Ginsburg pronounced that:

[t]he proper focus is not on the use of profits or surplus, but rather is
on losses and debts. If the expenditures of the enterprise exceed receipts, is the State in fact obligated to bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise? When the answer is "No"-both legally and
practically-then the Eleventh Amendment's core concern is not
implicated.
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criteria on which Eleventh Amendment immunity should be adjudged,' "Justice Ginsburg pinpointed the issue by stating that the
only dispute was whether the Port Authority's debts were those of
its creator States.' 1 3 In closing, Justice Ginsburg proclaimed that
the Port Authority was not entitled to sovereign immunity because
it is a financially-independent entity.11 4 Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and both the Walsh
15
and Hess cases were remanded for further proceedings.

In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens provided additional support for the majority's conclusion. 116 Justice Stevens explained
that by allowing individuals to pursue their remedies in federal
court, the Hess Court furthered the Framers' goal of promoting

justice. 7 Criticizing the Court's expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment18 in the past, Justice Stevens commended the
Court's holding.

112 Id. Both the Second and Third Circuits agreed that whether ajudgment will be
satisfied through the use of state funds is the best indicator of immunity. Id. (citations
omitted).
113 Id. (citations omitted).
114 Id. Justice Ginsburg perceived that because the Port Authority was self-sufficient, recovery of damages in federal court would not undermine the purposes behind the Eleventh Amendment, which are to maintain states' dignity and solvency. Id.
115 Id.
116Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117 Id. Reminding that the language of the Eleventh Amendment in its historical
context should be interpreted as prohibiting only diversity actions from being
brought against a state in federal court, id. (citing Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 509-10 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 289 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)), Justice
Stevens lamented that:
since Hans v. Louisiana . . . the Court has interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment as injecting broad notions of sovereign immunity into the
whole corpus of federal jurisdiction. The Court's decisions have given
us "two Eleventh Amendments," one narrow and textual and the
other-not truly a constitutional doctrine at all-based on prudential
considerations of comity and federalism.
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (other citations omitted).
118 Id. Justice Stevens proclaimed that "when confronted with the question of
whether ajudge-made doctrine of this character should be extended or contained, it
is entirely appropriate for a court to give controlling weight to the Founders' purpose
to 'establish Justice."' Id. at 407 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CQNST.
pmbl.). Justice Stevens continued, exclaiming that "[t]oday's decision is faithful to
that purpose." Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens referred to the Court's past interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment as "an engine of injustice." Id.; see Amar, supra note 1, at 1426 (explaining that sovereign immunity could be used by state actors, who intentionally violate
constitutional rights, to shield themselves from being adjudged liable in federal court
thereby possibly undermining citizens' remedies).
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Dissenting, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, rejected the Court's findings that PATH, an interstate entity, is not immune from suit. l" 9
Furthermore, the dissent disagreed with the majority's contention
that state funding of judgments should be the most important factor in determining whether an entity should be afforded immunity.12 0 Interpreting the majority's decision as a ruling that the
Eleventh Amendment is almost always inapplicable to concerted
state actions, Justice O'Connor disapproved of the Court's emphasis on the constitutionally-mandated requirement that Congress
121
consent to bistate compacts.
Conceding that congressional approval of compacts plays an
important part in our federal system of governance,1 2 2 Justice
O'Connor opined that the consent requirement has no repercussions on the degree of state power used in conjunction with the
creation of the compact.1 2 1 Justice O'Connor reasoned that congressional approval of a compact denotes state activity within the
scope of state power; therefore, the Justice urged that there is no
justification for per se disallowance of Eleventh Amendment
4
12

immunity.
Furthermore, the dissent insisted that even assuming the correctness of the majority's analysis that states cede part of their sov-

119 Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (citation omitted).
121 Id. The dissent maintained that the majority's decision rested on the premise
that through participating in a bistate compact, the participant states "ceded their
sovereignty." Id. (citation omitted). The dissent condemned the Court's expansive
reasoning. Id. at 408-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's participation in the compact's creation should not be determinative in assessing immunity).
122 Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that in Cuyler v.
Adams, the Court explained that Congressional approval of concerted state action is
required to ensure both that states are not impinging on federal concerns and that
their actions will not interfere so as to significantly disadvantage other states. Id. (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 n.8 (1981) (quotation omitted)).
123 Id. Justice O'Connor noted that "the consent clause neither transforms the nature of state power nor makes Congress a full-fledged participant in the underlying
agreement; it requires only that Congress 'check any infringement of the rights of the
national government.'" Id. (quoting 2 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES § 1403, at 264 (1873)).
124 Id. at 408-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor proclaimed that sov-

ereign immunity is implicated when states permissibly exercise state power. Id. at 409
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice continued, acknowledging that "'[i]f
[C]ongress consent[s], then the states ...in this respect [are] restored to their original inherent sovereignty; such consent being the sole limitation imposed by the constitution, when given, [leaves] the states as they were before .

. . .'"

Id. (quoting

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838)) (citing LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AsERic_.A

CONs-rrrTi

ONAL LAW § 6-33, at 523 (2d ed. 1988)).
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ereignty to Congress in creating bistate entities, it does not
necessarily follow that particular entities are unworthy of sovereign
immunity. 125 Justice O'Connor proposed that the correct interpretation of the Constitution results in a presumption that interstate
entities are conferred with immunity absent a clear and express
indication that Congress intended to abrogate such immunity in a
specific case. 126 Lamenting that the Court ignored traditional Eleventh Amendment analysis, Justice O'Connor rejected the Court's
reasoning because it suggests that Congress can unilaterally decide
whether the Amendment will apply in the context of interstate
entities. 127
Noting the majority's inconsistency concerning the weight attributed to the States' ability to control the activities of an interstate entity, the dissent asserted that simply because "arm-of-thestate" analysis may lead to a tenuous basis for applying sovereign
immunity does not mean that a presumption of amenability to suit
should be made.1 21 Justice O'Connor emphasized that multiple
states acting in concert may be just as entitled to Eleventh Amend1 29
ment immunity as a single state.
Acknowledging that the Court correctly recognized problems
with applying a multi-factor test, Justice O'Connor questioned the
majority's emphasis on the relationship between the state treasuries and the entity in assessing whether immunity is proper.1 3 0 In
relying on this factor, the dissent argued that the Court was miniId.
Id. Justice O'Connor based this proposition on judicial precedents that have
consistently required that Congress express intent to abrogate immunity using a clear
and unambiguous statement. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 240 (1985)) (other quotations omitted).
127 Id. (citation omitted). The dissent noted the majority's implication that even if
the states intended an entity to be conferred with sovereign immunity, "the baseline is
no immunity ... [unless] Congress manifests a contrary intent." Id. The dissent
observed that the Court has never before "held that the Eleventh Amendment immunity itself attaches at the whim of Congress." Id.
128 Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the Court emphasized the states' lack of control over interstate entities, thereby implying that state control is relevant to Eleventh
Amendment analysis. Id. The Justice pointed out, however, that in other portions of
the opinion the Court disclaimed the importance of inquiring into state control over
the entity. Id. (citation omitted).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 409, 410 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor indicated that the
six-factor test proposed in Lake Country Estates provided little guidance to lower courts.
Id. at 409 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text
(discussing Lake County Estates). The Justice proclaimed, however, that neither the
Eleventh Amendment nor Supreme Court precedents compel the conclusion that an
entity's reliance on the state treasury is determinative for assessing immunity. Hess,
115 S.Ct. at 410 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
125
126

460
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mizing state sovereignty by removing constitutionally provided immunity.'
The dissent denounced the majority's analysis because
the language of the Eleventh Amendment does not distinguish between suits brought "'in law or equity.'" 1 12 Therefore, the dissent
rejected the Court's highlighting of monetary factors. 133
Justice O'Connor conceded that the majority was correct in
suggesting that an entity funded by state treasuries is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity."' The dissent, however, refused
to validate the corollary-that an entity not funded by state treasuries is not entitled to immunity.'
The essential indicator of immu3 6
nity, the dissent proposed, is state control over the entity.1
Emphasizing state control, Justice O'Connor concluded, effectuates a balance which protects state sovereignty while simultaneously
precluding abuse of the Eleventh Amendment."3 7
Next, the dissent professed that the control test would encompass the majority's treasury factor and, further, would expand the
scope of inquiry in making a determination of immunity.13 8 This
approach, Justice O'Connor opined, would ensure that states pos1 39
sess the flexibility essential in maintaining sovereign authority.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI) (citations omitted).
133 Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that although
Chisolm v. Georgia, which gave rise to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, involved money damages, the Eleventh Amendment clearly extends beyond the specific
issues posed by Chisolm and applies to equitable suits as well. Id. (citing Cory v. White,
457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (explaining that "the Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly
applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity")) (other
citations omitted); see supra note 4 (discussing the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment).
134 Id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent indicated that if a state was
forced to pay ajudgment rendered by a federal court, "its ability to set its own agenda,
to control its own internal machinery, and to plan for the future-all essential prerequisites of sovereignty-would be grievously impaired." Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. Justice O'Connor argued that "the proper question is whether the State possesses sufficient control over an entity performing governmental functions that the entity may properly be called an extension of the State itself." Id. The dissent remarked
that sufficient control may exist regardless of whether a state treasury is liable for the
entity's debts. Id. at 410-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor maintained
than an "arm-of-the-State... is an entity that undertakes state functions and is politically accountable to the State, and by extension, to the electorate." Id. at 411
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Therefore, the Justice asserted that "the critical inquiry
. ..should be whether and to what extent the elected state government exercises
oversight over the entity." Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. (citation omitted).
139 Id. The dissent noted that it is unlikely that an entity would be funded by state
treasuries and fail the proposed control test. Id.
131
132
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Addressing the majority's dismissal of a control test, 4 ° Justice
O'Connor commented that the fact that an entity could be created
or terminated at the state's prerogative does not signify fulfillment
of the control test.14 Rather, the dissent insisted, the assessment
of control rests on state involvement and oversight of an entity's
affairs.

142

Applying the control test to Hess, the dissenting Justices concluded that PATH was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
because the States maintained sufficient control over both the Port
Authority and PATH. 143 The dissent pointed out that each State
was entitled to select, and had the power to remove, its own commissioners, that the governors of New York and New Jersey could
veto actions taken by his or her State's commissioners, and that
commissioners from each State had to be present at all Port Authority meetings."M Accordingly, the dissenters opined that the
States exercised sufficient control over the Port Authority and
Eleventh Amendment's protection
PATH, thereby warranting the
14 5
from suit in federal court.
Faced with the opportunity to end the confusion surrounding
the application of the Eleventh Amendment, the Hess Court, like
its predecessors, failed to read the Amendment as it was intended. 146 Although the majority correctly held that PATH was
amenable to suit in federal court, 4 7 the Court continued to apply
the Eleventh Amendment as judicially reconstructed. Rather than
follow the Constitution as written and predicate its holding on federal question jurisdiction not being subordinated to the Eleventh
Amendment, the Hess Court adopted an imprecise test to deter140 Id. (citation omitted). The majority rejected the adoption of a control test because states have control over cities, counties, and political subdivisions, and yet, these
instrumentalities have never been afforded Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).
141 Id. (quotation omitted).
142 Id. Justice O'Connor articulated that the control test should focus on actual
state oversight as opposed to a state's potential for taking action. Id. The dissent
instructed that to assess whether a state sufficiently controls an entity, one must look
to state law. Id. The Justice announced that if a state, pursuant to state law, delegates
control of an entity to municipalities, then the control test has not been met and the
Eleventh Amendment will not confer the entity with sovereign immunity. Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-5, 32:1-17 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 6405, 6417 (McKinney 1979)).
45 Id. at 412 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146 See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 2004 (calling for "the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the eleventh amendment applies only to cases in which the jurisdiction of
the federal court depends solely upon party status").
147 Hess, 115 S.Ct. at 397, 406.
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mine "arm-of-the-state" status. 148
Without question, states are sovereign entities within their
own spheres.14 9 Absent constitutional conferral of authority to the
federal government enabling legislation in particular areas, the
states maintain the power to legislate and administer laws in their
own individual capacities in order to serve their own best interests.' 5 At the same time, however, the Constitution vests the federal government with the power to make and execute laws that
impact the United States as a whole. 15 1
It is antithetical to this system of governance to interpret the
Eleventh Amendment in a manner that allows states to escape fed148 See id. at 404, 406 (recognizing that dependence on the state treasury is the most
important consideration in deciding whether an entity should be immune). In contrast, Judge Gibbons argued that the Court should recognize Congress's power to
abrogate state immunity in all matters subject to federal regulation. Gibbons, supra
note 8, at 2004. Similarly, Justice Brennan lamented that the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence has been unstable and lacks "a firm historical foundation,
or a clear rationale." Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 257 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed out that even an anti-Federalist author believed
that the powers of federal courts should be consistent with the powers of the Congress. Id. at 272 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Furthermore, Justice Stevens opined that the Eleventh Amendment should be
interpreted as barring only diversity actions brought against a state. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at
407 (Stevens, J. concurring). With respect to Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
stating that prior interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment have deviated from the
Founders' intentions by conflicting with "the just principle that there should be a
remedy for every wrong," id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)),
one should note that Justice Stevens's logic can be questioned, as the Eleventh
Amendment does not preclude remedies in state court. See Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 560, 565 (1991) (citations omitted) (discussing that the
inability to bring a claim in federal court does not preclude pursuing a cause of action
in a state court).
149 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing state sovereignty).
150 U.S. CONST amend. X. The United States Government is one of enumerated
powers; "it can exercise only the powers granted to it." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 404 (1819). The McCulloch Court noted that "the question respecting the
extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist." Id.
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress with legislative powers); art II, § 3
(providing the executive branch with executive powers). In Ex parte Virginia, the
Court explained that:
in exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which
the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not
reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the
right to exercise all its granted powers, though they may interfere with
the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had not
been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental
powers of the States. It is carved out of them.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).
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eral jurisdiction in matters that are federal by their nature."' Such
an interpretation is inconsistent with the Founders' conception of
a strong and unified national government, and furthermore, devi15 3
ates from the rationale behind federal preemption.
Though it is only on rare occasions that the Court overrules an
existing precedent,'5 4 constitutional consistency and fidelity to the
principles behind the organization of the United States, and behind the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, dictate that immunity should apply only in diversity suits."5 5 Failure to comport with
the Eleventh Amendment as written has yielded inconsistencies
and has led to slippery-slope tests that cannot be reconciled with
the underlying purposes behind our federal government.
Reading the Eleventh Amendment as written would not impermissibly infringe on state sovereignty, but rather, would restore
the balance that the Constitution intended. The Court moved in
the right direction by its refusal to confer immunity on PATH.
152 One must consider whether it is possible that the Founders conceived the formation of a federal government where federal courts could not have original jurisdiction in matters concerning federal law. For example, in McCulloch v. Mayland the
Court proclaimed:
it may with great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted
with such ample powers, on due execution of which the happiness and
prosperity of a nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with
ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408.
It should be noted, however, that in limited circumstances, plaintiffs can sue
states or state officials in federal court. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
23 (1989) (holding that Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity under the
Commerce Clause, thereby rendering states amenable to suit in federal court); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (concluding that Congress may abrogate
state or state officials' immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment thereby allowing
them to be sued in federal court); Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (allowing an equitable claim seeking prospective relief against a state official acting
outside the realm of his authority to be heard in federal court).
153 See BLACK's Law DIcrMONARv 1177 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "preemption" as a
"[d]octrine adopted by [the] U.S. Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of
such a national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state laws"); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (proclaiming that the "Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
154 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808-09, 2814-16 (1992) (discussing the Court's reluctance to overrule precedents and the Court's commitment to
adherence with the rule of stare decisis) (citations omitted).
155 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' beliefs that the
Eleventh Amendment was intended to apply solely to diversity actions instituted
against states).
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One can only hope that the Court will continue to progress by
looking back to 1795 to interpret the Eleventh Amendment.
Jennifer G. Schecter

